Design as communication in micro-strategy — strategic sensemaking and sensegiving mediated through designed artefacts. by Stevens, John
Citation:  Stevens,  John  (2013)  Design  as  communication  in  micro-strategy  —  strategic 
sensemaking and sensegiving mediated through designed artefacts. Artificial Intelligence for 
Engineering Design, Analysis and Manufacturing, 27 (2). pp. 133-142. ISSN 0890-0604 
Published by: Cambridge University Press
URL:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0890060413000036 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0890060413000036>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/12632/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to 
access the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items 
can be reproduced,  displayed or  performed,  and given to  third parties in  any format  or 
medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior 
permission or charge, provided the authors, title and full bibliographic details are given, as 
well  as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata page. The content must  not  be 
changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any format or medium 
without  formal  permission  of  the  copyright  holder.   The  full  policy  is  available  online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/policies.html
This document may differ from the final, published version of the research and has been 
made available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the 
published version of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be 
required.)
 ۘۢٷ ۧ۝ۧۺ۠ٷۢﯠ ﮞۢۛ۝ۧۙﯚ ۛۢ۝ۦۙۙۢ۝ۛۢﯗ ۦۣۚ ۙۗۢۙۛ۝۠۠ۙۨۢﯢ ۠ٷ۝ۗں۝ۨۦﯠ
ۛۢ۝ۦ۩ۨۗٷۚ۩ۢٷﯞ
ﯗﯢﯠﮡۛۦۣﮠۙۛۘ۝ۦۖۡٷۗﮠۧ۠ٷۢۦ۩ۣ۞ﮡﮡﮤۤۨۨۜ
 ẾẴẾỄặẬẹ ΫẹẲẴẾẰ́ ẲẹẴẽẰẰẹẴẲẹϋ ẽẺằ ẰẮẹẰẲẴặặẰếẹ ặẬẴẮ״Ẵếẽ ۦۣۚ ۧۙۗ۝۪ۦۙۧ ۠ٷۣۢ۝ۨ۝ۘۘﯠ
ẲẹẴẽỀếẮẬằỀẹẬ ắẹẬ
ۙۦۙۜ ﭞۗ۝۠ﯙ ﮤۧۨۦۙ۠ٷ ۠۝ٷۡﯗ
ۙۦۙۜ ﭞۗ۝۠ﯙ ﮤۣۧۢ۝ۨۤ۝ۦۗۧۖ۩ۑ
ۙۦۙۜ ﭞۗ۝۠ﯙ ﮤۧۨۢ۝ۦۤۙۦ ۠ٷ۝ۗۦۣۙۡۡﯙ
ۙۦۙۜ ﭞۗ۝۠ﯙ ﮤ ۙۧ۩ ۣۚ ۧۡۦ ۙے
 ۘۢٷ ۛۢ۝ﭞٷۡۙۧۢۙۧ ۗ۝ۛۙۨٷۦۨۑ ﮤۺۛۙۨٷۦۣۨۧۦۗ۝ۡ ۢ۝ ۣۢ۝ۨٷۗ۝ۢ۩ۣۡۡۗ ۧٷ ۢۛ۝ۧۙﯚ
ۧۨۗٷۚ۝ۨۦٷ ۘۙۢۛ۝ۧۙۘ ۜۛ۩ۣۦۜۨ ۘۙۨٷ۝ۘۙۡ ۛۢ۝۪۝ۛۙۧۢۙۧ
۪ۧۢۙۙۨۑ ۣۢۜﯣ
ھۀڽ ­ ڿڿڽ ۤۤ ﮞڿڽڼھ ۺٷﯞ ﮡ ھڼ ۙ۩ۧۧﯢ ۠ٷ۝ۗۙۤۑ ﮡ Үھ ۙۡ۩ۣ۠Џ ﮡ ۛۢ۝ۦ۩ۨۗٷۚ۩ۢٷﯞ ۘۢٷ ۧ۝ۧۺ۠ٷۢﯠ ﮞۢۛ۝ۧۙﯚ ۛۢ۝ۦۙۙۢ۝ۛۢﯗ ۦۣۚ ۙۗۢۙۛ۝۠۠ۙۨۢﯢ ۠ٷ۝ۗں۝ۨۦﯠ
ڿڽڼھ ۠۝ۦۤﯠ үڽ ﮤۙۢ۝ۣ۠ۢ ۘۙۜۧ۝۠ۖ۩ێ ﮞңڿڼڼڼڼڿڽۀڼңڼڼҰүڼۑﮡҮڽڼڽﮠڼڽ ﮤﯢۍﯚ
ңڿڼڼڼڼڿڽۀڼңڼڼҰүڼۑﮰۨۗٷۦۨۧۖٷﮡۛۦۣﮠۙۛۘ۝ۦۖۡٷۗﮠۧ۠ٷۢۦ۩ۣ۞ﮡﮡﮤۤۨۨۜ ﮤۙ۠ۗ۝ۨۦٷ ۧ۝ۜۨ ۣۨ ﭞۢ۝ﮐ
ﮤۙ۠ۗ۝ۨۦٷ ۧ۝ۜۨ ۙۨ۝ۗ ۣۨ ۣ۫ﯜ
 ۜۛ۩ۣۦۜۨ ۘۙۨٷ۝ۘۙۡ ۛۢ۝۪۝ۛۙۧۢۙۧ ۘۢٷ ۛۢ۝ﭞٷۡۙۧۢۙۧ ۗ۝ۛۙۨٷۦۨۑ ﮤۺۛۙۨٷۦۣۨۧۦۗ۝ۡ ۢ۝ ۣۢ۝ۨٷۗ۝ۢ۩ۣۡۡۗ ۧٷ ۢۛ۝ۧۙﯚ ﮠ۶ڿڽڼھڿ ۪ۧۢۙۙۨۑ ۣۢۜﯣ
ﮡҮڽڼڽﮠڼڽﮤ۝ۣۘ ھۀڽ­ڿڿڽ ۤۤ ﮞҮھ ﮞۛۢ۝ۦ۩ۨۗٷۚ۩ۢٷﯞ ۘۢٷ ۧ۝ۧۺ۠ٷۢﯠ ﮞۢۛ۝ۧۙﯚ ۛۢ۝ۦۙۙۢ۝ۛۢﯗ ۦۣۚ ۙۗۢۙۛ۝۠۠ۙۨۢﯢ ۠ٷ۝ۗں۝ۨۦﯠ ﮠۧۨۗٷۚ۝ۨۦٷ ۘۙۢۛ۝ۧۙۘ
ңڿڼڼڼڼڿڽۀڼңڼڼҰүڼۑ
ۙۦۙۜ ﭞۗ۝۠ﯙ ﮤ ۣۧۢ۝ۧۧ۝ۡۦۙێ ۨۧۙ۩ۥۙې
ڿڽڼھ ۺٷﯞ ڽھ ۣۢ ۀүڽﮠۀﮠڿҮڽﮠھҰڽ ﮤۧۧۙۦۘۘٷ ێﯢ ﮞﯗﯢﯠﮡۛۦۣﮠۙۛۘ۝ۦۖۡٷۗﮠۧ۠ٷۢۦ۩ۣ۞ﮡﮡﮤۤۨۨۜ ۣۡۦۚ ۘۙۘٷۣۣ۠ۢ۫ﯚ
Design as communication in microstrategy:
Strategic sensemaking and sensegiving mediated
through designed artifacts
JOHN STEVENS
School of Design, Northumbria University, City Campus East, Newcastle Upon Tyne, United Kingdom
(RECEIVED September 30, 2011; ACCEPTED February 20, 2012)
Abstract
This paper relates key concepts of strategic cognition in microstrategy to design practice. It considers the potential roles of
designers’ output in strategic sensemaking and sensegiving. Designed artifacts play well-known roles as communication
media; sketches, renderings, models, and prototypes are created to explore and test possibilities and to communicate these
options within and outside the design team. This article draws on design and strategy literature to propose that designed
artifacts can and do play a role as symbolic communication resources in sensemaking and sensegiving activities that impact
strategic decision making and change. Extracts from interviews with three designers serve as illustrative examples. This
article is a call for further empirical exploration of such a complex subject.
Keywords: Communication; Design; Sensegiving; Sensemaking; Strategy
1. INTRODUCTION
The design process relies heavily on designed artifacts them-
selves as communication media (Carlile, 2002; Eckert &
Boujut, 2003; Crilly et al., 2008); sketches, renderings, mod-
els, and prototypes are created not only to explore and test
possibilities but also to communicate these options within
and outside the design team. Of course, senior managers
and executives are often involved in approving design output,
particularly for important new products. However, there may
bemore subtle, less documented exchanges mediated through
design at such a senior level, having powerful and far-
reaching influence.
The received view of the typical design process has design-
ers responding to a brief or problem statement, which at-
tempts to define the requirements of the output. A large
body of research has established many valuable descriptive
theories and models around this complex process. There is
also a body of work examining the artifact’s role as a commu-
nication medium between designer and consumer (for a sum-
mary, see Crilly et al., 2008). This article is not concerned
with these topics but seeks to complement them, exploring
how designers’ output might play a role in microstrategy ac-
tivity; it proposes a connection between design practice and
microstrategy, with respect to sensemaking in particular.
Much strategy research has focused on leadership actions
and decisions and macrolevel behaviors, but there is recent
recognition of the impact of day-to-day activities of middle-
and lower-echelon employees on strategic decisions and
change. Johnson et al. (2003, p. 3) argued for “a shift in the
strategy debate towards a micro perspective on strategy and
strategizing. More specifically . . . for an emphasis on the de-
tailed processes and practices which constitute the day-to-day
activities of organisational life and which relate to strategic
outcomes”—what they term an activity-based view. Much
work has been done since this call, with growing body of lit-
erature termedmicrostrategy, strategy as practice, and behav-
ioral strategy.1
In this vein, I propose a conceptual synthesis, namely, that
designed artifacts can and do play a role as symbolic re-
sources in sensemaking and sensegiving activities that impact
strategic decision making and change. This claim is based
mainly on existing literature of sensemaking and microstrat-
egy, relevant to design because it helps to position the lit-
Requests for reprints to: John Stevens, School of Design, Northumbria
University, City Campus East, Newcastle Upon Tyne NE1 8ST, United
Kingdom. E-mail: john.stevens@northumbria.ac.uk
1 The domains of microstrategy, strategy as practice, and behavioural strat-
egy are very similar, and for some authors interchangeable. For this article I
use the termmicrostrategy to denote the general subject domain, including all
three.
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tle-documented mediating role of designed artifacts in formu-
lation and communication of strategy.
In Section 2, the literature of microstrategy is introduced,
then sensemaking and related concepts. The nature of design
as sensemaking is discussed, then design’s role in strategy
more generally. I next discuss designed artifacts as boundary
objects and as symbolic resources for strategic sensemaking
and sensegiving. Extracts from interviews with three design-
ers are presented in Section 3 as illustrative examples of de-
sign contributions being made in sensemaking and sensegiv-
ing activities at various levels. Section 4 contains discussion
of the claims in this Introduction, and Section 5 provides a
conclusion.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Microstrategy themes
The strategy as science approach that dominated the 20th cen-
tury saw strategy as purely a matter of analysis and planning,
but now it is largely discredited. Mintzberg (1994, p. 321)
methodically and thoroughly took apart the conception that
strategy can be planned, yet in strategic management, situa-
tions are assessed, decisions made, directions set, and actions
taken. Accounting for the complex interplay of human ac-
tions and interactions requires a closer scrutiny of how strat-
egy work is actually done by people (Whittington, 1996).
This view recognizes the challenge that “the decision context
of strategic management involves organizationally situated
managers, widespread uncertainty, and poorly defined prob-
lems with unknowable social and economic consequences”
(Powell et al., 2011, p. 1377). Research specialisms have
emerged in the past decade to address so-called microstrat-
egy, or strategy as practice through an activity-based view
(Johnson et al., 2003). Applying activity theory, this is con-
cerned with how strategy emerges from the interactions
between actors and their contexts (Jarzabkowski, 2003). Be-
havioral strategy applies cognitive and social psychology to
strategic management theory, grounded in “realistic assump-
tions about human cognition, emotion, and social interaction”
(Powell et al., 2011, p. 1369). The strategic cognition per-
spective examines the cognitive structures and processes in-
volved in diagnosis, decision making, and implementation
(Narayanan et al., 2011). Seidl (2007) notes that the multitude
of strategy perspectives, especially in strategy as practice,
cannot be unified into a single field but exist as an ecosystem
of autonomous discourses.
2.2. Sensemaking and sensegiving
Much strategic cognition research has focused on sensemak-
ing, by individuals, groups, and as an organization, and how it
affects strategic change. The strategic cognition perspective
holds that top-level managers engage in sensemaking in order
to make strategic judgments about change. There is a variety
of definitions of sensemaking (Weick, 1995), although broadly
it is taken tomean the process of givingmeaning to experience.
Thismight be regarded as placing stimuli (such as observations
or data) in a framework or cognitive map. This enables one to
“comprehend, understand, explain, attribute, extrapolate, and
predict” (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988, p. 51); to understand
connections among, for example, people, places, and events
(Klein et al., 2006); or to explain surprises or discrepancies.
Weick (2001) compared sensemaking to a cartographer’s
mapping of a landscape, converting “a world of experience
into an intelligible world” (p. 9). In situations of strategic
change, it is the means by which members grasp the firm’s
internal and external environment and “define a revised con-
ception of the organisation” (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991,
p. 434).
Sensemaking is triggered when a person becomes aware of
a disruption, a deviation from the expected (Weick, 1995,
p. 5). This awareness occurs through a deliberate or forma-
lized activity of information gathering or scanning (Daft &
Weick, 1984). In a strategy context this means searching ex-
ternal and internal environments for factors important for the
future performance. Starbuck and Milliken (1988) prefer the
term noticing to scanning, implying its less formal, less de-
liberate nature and accounting for its more serendipitous
aspects.
Sensegiving is the reciprocal activity to sensemaking, by
which the outcomes of sensemaking, such as judgments to
enact change, are articulated and given meaning to facilitate
interpretation by others; in the corporate setting, this means
the rest of the organization and other stakeholders (Gioia &
Chittipeddi, 1991; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Gioia et al.,
1994). For change to succeed, it is crucial to that all constitu-
ents understand and accept the change, and sensegiving refers
to the processes by which this change is framed and dissemi-
nated to ensure “buy in” (Fiss & Zajac, 2006). Gioia & Chit-
tipeddi (1991, p. 446) suggest that a “captivating vision” is
key because “it provides a symbolic foundation for stake-
holders to develop an alternative interpretive scheme” and
that “the symbolic constructions used to create meaning for
others (i.e., to give sense) are instrumental to the effectiveness
of the critical stage of proposing and initiating an overall
change effort.” However, 15 years later, Fiss & Zajac (2006,
p. 1174) suggest that “more attention needs to be paid to
the symbolic processes” involved. Another important related
phenomenon is issue selling: the actions of constituents by
which awareness of issues is raised. Through recognition of
the sensegiving and issue-selling phenomena, Dutton and
others have demonstrated the impact that middle-level man-
agers and other constituents can have on strategy making
(Dutton & Jackson, 1994; Dutton et al., 2001). This is perti-
nent to the microstrategy perspective and to the claim of this
paper, namely, that these other constituents might include de-
signers, who potentially make a large contribution to these
symbolic processes. As well as being a powerful means of
creating and communicating captivating visions, designing
is itself seen as an act of sensemaking, and this is discussed
next.
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2.3. Design as sensemaking
As Weick notes, sensemaking is not the same as interpreta-
tion of an objective reality. Interpretation implies the exis-
tence of an “it,” that “something is there, a text in the world,
waiting to be discovered” (Weick, 1995, p. 13), but sense-
making constructs or invents the “it.” It is “about sizing up
a situation, about trying to discover what you have while
you simultaneously act and have some effect on what you dis-
cover . . . [It] is seldom an occasion for passive diagnosis. In-
stead, it is usually an attempt to grasp a developing situation
in which the observer affects the trajectory of that develop-
ment” (Weick, 2001, p. 460).
Weick’s comparison of passive diagnosis with an ongoing,
observer-influenced trajectory is similar to Simon’s compar-
ison of design and science: whereas scientific endeavor seeks
to understand “what is,” the activity of designing constructs
or invents a normative “it,” that which “should be” (Simon,
1969, p. 114). Buchanan’s (1992, p. 17) characterization
of design practice and wicked problems has even stronger
congruence:
The designer begins with what should be called a quasi-
subject matter, tenuously existing within the problems
and issues of specific circumstances. Out of the specific
possibilities of a concrete situation, the designer must con-
ceive a design that will lead to this or that particular
product. A quasisubject matter is not an undetermined sub-
ject waiting to be made determinate. It is an indeterminate
subject waiting to be made specific and concrete.
Thus, determinacy, then specificity, emerges through the de-
sign process itself. Moreover, “Designs are strongly influ-
enced by the representations in which they are expressed”
(Eckert & Boujut, 2003). Just as in Weick’s sensemaking,
the observer affects the trajectory of “grasping a situation”
and artifacts such as sketches and models created in the de-
sign process affect the developing design trajectory. This is
through their use as communication tools or boundary ob-
jects, as discussed shortly.
Kolko (2010) observes that synthesis activity in designing
is an abductive sensemaking process. “Through efforts of
data manipulation, organization, pruning, and filtering, de-
signers produce information and knowledge. . . . Designers,
as well as those who research and describe the process of de-
sign, continually describe design as a way of organizing com-
plexity or finding clarity in chaos” (Kolko, 2010, p. 17).
Weick’s constructed or invented “it” has then a parallel in
what designers do, this quasisubject matter to be transformed
into something specific and concrete. This may imply that de-
signing is, or is akin to, a sensemaking process.
2.4. Design and strategy
We have seen that some authors agree that the design process
may be seen as an instance of individuals and groups in a
sensemaking activity. Further to this, I propose that the de-
signed output (the artifact) is a symbolic embodiment of
the designer’s or the design team’s sensemaking, both in a
personal sense and on behalf of their employer or client.
This symbolic embodiment may then be key in sensegiving,
influencing sensemaking by others engaged in strategy, as
will be expounded after a brief account of design’s widening
remit into strategy activities.
The academic examination of value added through product
design is long standing and quite comprehensive, but more re-
cent thinking emphasizes the contribution design can make to
operations outside of manufacturing. Design practice extends
to areas of research and customer insight, using such spe-
cialists as social psychologists, ethnographers, and anthropolo-
gists (Blaich & Blaich, 1993, p. 12). Design may also be
applied where the end users are not the firm’s customers
but other stakeholders; Cooper & Press (1994) suggest that
designers contribute in three key operational areas: the design
of corporate identity, of saleable products, and of operating
environments (see also, e.g., Hayes, 1990; Olson et al., 1998;
Phillips, 2004).
More recent work attends to design as a tactical and strate-
gic resource, notably as a tool with which to tackle wicked
problems. While designers cannot claim a monopoly on crea-
tivity, they do apply creative methods to complex problems
framed in real-world constraints. These distinctive methods
have an important potential to address complex challenges,
as has been recognized and investigated, initially by those ex-
amining the design process and the ways individual designers
work their way through it and later by a wider group in indus-
try and academia looking to design thinking as a tool to help
understand andmeet the complex challenges where analytical
approaches are found lacking (see, e.g., Liedtka, 2004;
Brown, 2008; Lockwood, 2009; Martin, 2009).
The origins of modern theories of the design process can be
attributed largely to Scho¨n (1983), who argued that design is
a thought paradigm in its own right: “artistic, intuitive pro-
cesses . . . [applied] to situations of uncertainty, instability,
uniqueness, and value conflict” where objective approaches
had been inadequate (cited by Cross, 2001, p. 54). Buchanan
(1992) built on this, (re)introducing the design research read-
ership to Rittel’s concept of wicked problems in systems and
planning theory (Rittel, 1972; Rittel & Webber, 1973). Rittel
and Webber and Buchanan persuasively argue that many de-
sign problems are wicked.2 If design methods and tools are
well suited to addressing wicked design problems, then these
methods and tools may arguably be useful for wicked prob-
lems outside the traditional design domain; if strategy is the
2 Wicked problems are not only complex but also, in contrast to “tame”
problems that may be addressed through positivist reasoning, they have no
single correct solution, only “good” (or perhaps more commonly, “better
than . . .”). They have no stopping rules to define when a solution has been
reached (one can always aim for better) and there is no definitive test of a so-
lution; it can only be assessed against its own formulation (the problem state-
ment) and against other possible solutions. (For Rittel’s 11 characteristics of
wicked problems, see Rittel, 1972, pp. 392–393.)
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act of designing an enterprise, then design thinking might be
profitably applied to strategy (Liedtka, 2004; Martin, 2009).
Methods used in designing and the resulting artifacts can
help in “exploring possibilities and building a qualitative un-
derstanding of what holds meaning, and hence value, for
customers, employees, suppliers and other stake holders”
(Stevens & Moultrie, 2011, p. 481). Artifacts created by de-
signers and shared among senior managers and business lead-
ers include representations of complex or intangible systems,
of qualitative research findings, or simply a new product, ser-
vice, or market. These might take a variety of forms, physical
(such as models or working prototypes), graphic (renderings,
charts, images, or sketches), or narrative (storyboards or vid-
eos). The value of these artifacts is in their capacity to capture
and transfer, translate and transform knowledge, in their sta-
tus as boundary objects.
2.5. Boundary objects in design, in strategic
sensemaking
Carlile argues (at least in a product innovation context) that
boundary objects (Star & Griesemer, 1989) are important in
helping to establish “common interests for making trade-
offs and transforming domain-specific knowledge” (Carlile,
2004, p. 563). Such boundary objects may be “simple or com-
plex representations that can be observed and then used across
different functional settings . . . (i.e., sketches, assembly
drawings, parts, prototype assemblies, mock-ups, and com-
puter simulations)” (Carlile, 2002, p. 451). They “can provide
a concrete means of representing different functional interests
and facilitating their negotiation and transformation in
product-development settings” (Carlile, 2004, p. 559).
Carlile (2004) identifies three orders of increasing com-
plexity in knowledge sharing: knowledge transfer, transla-
tion, and transformation. Knowledge transfer and translation
occur at syntactic and semantic boundaries, respectively.
Knowledge transformation occurs at more complex bounda-
ries of pragmatic or political understanding, where actors must
negotiate their differing interests and cognitive frameworks.
Eckert and Boujut (2003, p. 145) characterize boundary ob-
jects in design to include any physical and virtual artifacts
(sketches, technical drawings, models and prototypes) “that
can convey meaning in interpersonal communication, but
have an existence beyond a single act of communication.”
These objects serve as reference points but may be understood
differently by the different participants: “Many design pro-
cesses depend on the different participants interpreting bound-
ary objects not in the sameway but in compatibleways” (Eck-
ert & Boujut, 2003, p. 146); new ideas arise and problems are
identified through “interpreting vague or ambiguous objects,
and then negotiating over their intended meaning.”
This interpretation and negotiation might be regarded as
sensemaking dialogue, and even the dialogue itself is a
boundary object: “a way to externalize thoughts and achieve
a shared construction of meaning. These dialogs may be con-
sidered boundary objects that permit exchange of thoughts.
Other examples of boundary objects include cognitive maps
and stored artifacts that can be retrieved for viewing” (Nosek,
2004, p. 56). From a microstrategy perspective, “strategy
practices are the social, symbolic, and material tools through
which strategy work is done . . . [including] material artefacts
and technologies, such as PowerPoint, flipcharts, and spread-
sheets” (Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008, p. 282). Jarzab-
kowski (2005) observes that semantic and pragmatic bound-
aries are likely to exist in many strategy processes, because
they inherently span hierarchies. Strategy tools may therefore
assume the status of boundary objects (Spee & Jarzabkowski,
2009). “Sensemaking is influenced by the actual, implied or
imagined presence of others. Sensible meanings tend to be
those for which there is social support, consensual validation,
and shared relevance” (Weick, 2001, p. 461). Artifacts as
boundary objects may aid consensual validation and promote
shared relevance. The design process includes imagined oth-
ers, and the artifact may serve to make them present for other
actors. The artifact may also provoke critique or debate
around philosophical or ethical issues, and some design activ-
ity focuses solely on this purpose, detached from any com-
mercial imperative, such as Dunne & Raby’s critical design
(Dunne, 1999; Dunne & Raby, 2001) or Walker’s (2006)
propositional objects.
Thus, although neither Eckert and Boujout nor any other
authors have examined designed artifacts as boundary objects
in the strategy context, Jarzabkowski and others identify a
role of material artifacts in strategy activity. Models and
ideal-type objects (generalized representations of a varied
group) can provide an abstraction that works for all knowl-
edge domains across syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic
boundaries (Star & Griesemer, 1989). Designed artifacts
serve this role in some knowledge boundaries, so artifacts
such as prototypes, concept sketches, and models might
play this role in strategy activity.
3. DESIGN AND STRATEGIC SENSEMAKING
I have recounted and inferred from established literature that
designing and strategy both involve an element of sensemak-
ing, that design methods and tools can help those doing strat-
egy to explore possibilities and build meaning, that boundary
objects are important in microstrategy and in designing, and
that designed artifacts may be meaningful boundary objects.
From here it does not necessarily follow that designing or the
artifacts resulting from designing are directly involved in stra-
tegic sensemaking. However, in sensemaking and sensegiv-
ing, symbols are important (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia
et al., 1994;Weick, 1995; Johnson et al., 2003). Sensemaking
is more about “plausibility, coherence and reasonableness”
(Weick, 1995, p. 61) than about accuracy, and this is where
the symbolic resources of sensemaking are helpful. Such
things as “myths, metaphors, platitudes, fables, and para-
digms” contain a “good story. And a good story . . . shows
patterns that may already exist in the puzzles an actor now
faces, or patterns that could be created anew in the interest
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ofmore orderand sense in the future. . . . [Theyare] templates . . .
the products of previous efforts at sensemaking. They ex-
plain. And they energise.” (Weick, 1995, p. 61). These sym-
bolic resources include the material artifacts and technologies
that are the tools of strategy (Jarzabkowski & Whittington,
2008) and whose stories contain patterns to be recognized
and acted on or revised and built upon. Is it such a great
leap to suggest that symbolic resources could also include de-
signers’ sketches, drawings, models, and prototypes?
Rouleau (2005), taking an activity-based view of strategic
change, offers a case example of the symbolic contribution of
designed artifacts. She describes how middle managers in a
clothing company “interpret and sell strategic change at the
organisational interface.” In examining the symbolic re-
sources in play, Rouleau identifies routines practiced by a
sales manager, which she calls primary sensemaking and
sensegiving micropractices. One routine Rouleau terms
building the product symbolically. This involves spending
time with the design team, to “enrich her vocabulary” with
the designers’ language of the new product line in order to
help her understand and convey something of the products’
essence. In another routine, “exploring the ‘feel’ of the
[new] market,” the sales manager borrows artifacts from the
designers to solicit feedback from retailers: “I bring the crea-
tion out of the design room. I like to show the sketches and
fabric samples to the people who will be selling directly to
the woman who is going to wear our clothing” (Rouleau,
2005, pp. 1420–1421).
Rouleau’s account brings design into the microstrategy and
strategic cognition literature, and provides an example of de-
signed artifacts having a role in microstrategy sensemaking
and sensegiving. These examples are artifacts from the design
for market process, so their role as symbolic resources is a
secondary by-product. In the next section, more examples
are presented, some of which are designed for the purpose
of their symbolic role.
3.1. Indicative examples
In this section I present some quotations from designers inter-
viewed in the course of a series of case studies (Stevens &
Moultrie, 2011), during which the idea for this paper arose.
This larger study sought to characterize design contributions
according to established models of strategic management.
The subject of this article had not been considered at the
time, but one of the themes to emerge in the study was design-
ers’ activities and resulting artifacts that were not intended for
the market, that is, they had some internal purpose. Seeking to
clarify these internal roles in terms of cognitive strategy, the
transcripts were revisited for a second analysis. Themes for
this second analysis were derived from the key texts already
mentioned (especially Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton & Ash-
ford, 1993; Weick, 1995; Narayanan et al., 2011). Interview
transcripts from the previous study were searched for any re-
marks that could be related to sensemaking and sensegiving,
to strategic decision making, long-range planning, and other
indicators such as change, complexity, future, symbols, visu-
alization, vision, and communication. Several industrial de-
signers reported examples where their output was not directly
part of the new product development stream and had im-
pacted company strategy in various ways. These cases are pre-
sented here in the form of anonymized, much-condensed
summaries; quotations are direct and verbatim from the
transcripts.
Like many empirical studies into business environments,
this study attempts to increase knowledge about a complex
situation by gathering voiced opinions. It does not seek to
prove or refute immutable, generalizable laws. It is an attempt
to describe phenomena that are observed or reported that may
be meaningful or useful in a more general context. The tran-
script extracts from three respondents are presented here as
possible examples of design contributions being made in
sensemaking and sensegiving activities at various levels.
They have been selected not to offer conclusive proof, nor
as typical or representative samples, but as illustrations of
why I think the theory is worth further investigation.
3.1.1. Andy
Andy works for a large European firm that designs and
manufactures mobile phones and devices, employing over
40,000 worldwide, with annual turnover around E40 billion
(2010). It employs several hundred industrial (product) de-
signers and interaction designers in London.
Andy is head of the firm’s midrange design strategy team
working to a 1–5 year horizon, bridging between long-term
strategic vision and the more immediately market-driven
product design team. He has about 20 years’ industry experi-
ence.
Planning a product portfolio for the years ahead is a strate-
gic task that designers in the firm are increasingly contribut-
ing to. Previously, decisions were made by the road-mapping
team in the business planning department, on the basis of
technical and functional specifications. However, the specifi-
cations alone cannot describe the products sufficiently to con-
vey the direction in which they would take the firm. Their
brand position is a crucial strategic consideration and is crit-
ically threatened at this time, but the subtleties and nuances of
the various products are not adequately captured or commu-
nicated in a spreadsheet of specifications.
On a spreadsheet it looks very similar but actually the de-
signs are very different, so they are not similar products in
terms of how people would respond to them. . . . We are
helping the business understand the market in more emo-
tional terms. (Andy)
Product designers in Andy’s team now create models to repre-
sent the future portfolio of products, which has a twofold ben-
efit: first, it provides a visual embodiment of a possible future,
a boundary object that is part of a process among top-tier
managers and senior executives that builds consensus and fa-
cilitates decisions.
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It’s about helping the business get clarity of what [the busi-
ness itself] is going to look like in 5 years. We have just
delivered some 20 handset models so that when we laid
them all out on the table we could say well, that’s pretty
much what our portfolio is going to look like. (Andy)
Second, this visual embodiment serves as a powerful sym-
bolm a “captivating vision,” in the rest of the firm, represent-
ing a strategic objective or mission, a shared vision for the
future:
It’s the only time that everyone really gets what you are
talking about, or they understand it in their own terms
and then can say okay, that will work. . . . If it’s on a spread-
sheet or in a strategy document, no one really actually has a
passion around it, and the best thing we can do is design
something that people like, they all get behind it. . . .
And then that gives something palpable, something that
we can talk about, particularly in global companies where
you have lots of different people speaking different lan-
guages, different cultures and reference points. (Andy)
To summarize Andy’s account, designers’ activities make
tangible the diverse business, market, and technological re-
quirements. Top-tier and midlevel managers including busi-
ness planning and brand management use designers’ artifacts
(prototypes, models, graphic boards, and simulations) in
building consensus and aiding decision making. Top-tier
and midlevel managers use designers’ artifacts to “build up
passion” around a strategic vision for other constituents.
3.1.2. Bruce
Bruce trained as an industrial designer and has around 15
years industry experience. He works in the large Research
& Development (R&D) group of a UK-based telecommuni-
cations firm active in technology and service delivery. The
firm has around 100,000 staff worldwide and headquarters
in London. Its annual turnover is approximately £20 billion
(2010). It primarily provides communications network ser-
vices and technology to the consumer, corporate, and public
sectors.
Most activity in R&D is carried out by scientists and tech-
nologists, and designers in the division are a small minority;
their main role is to conceive, explore, and visualize new ap-
plications of communications technology. These concepts are
presented as prototypes or visual stories used in board-level
sensemaking and decision making, by contributing to busi-
ness leaders’ awareness of technical possibilities and com-
petitor activity, and helping them generate ideas around
long-term options for the firm.
R&D designers use sketches, models, and prototypes to
“bring technology to life.” Visual methods are valued for
conveying and exploring ideas that are difficult to articulate
in words. Although their work must appear professional qual-
ity, an overstyled model or concept can distract from the prin-
ciple behind the concept; accounting for the complex factors
that lie behind the concept is more important than its appear-
ance.
Styling is downplayed within Research. It doesn’t earn me
any Brownie points. Here people aren’t interested in
whether it looks cool or funky. [Merely] being visual
doesn’t cut any mustard here. Sometimes it’s a hindrance.
The more holistic, strategic we can make something [the
better]: IP, potential revenue, and the backstory why
we’ve done this initial prototype, they’re the important
things. (Bruce)
However, a stylish concept attracts media publicity when it is
needed, such as when attempting sensegiving around a new
company direction. When they are taken up by the board,
concepts from R&D may have a far-reaching impact on the
business, influencing pricing structures or network infrastruc-
ture, or even creating new businesses for the group.
[We generate and communicate] concepts which together
might actually create a whole new business case related
to the delivery of lots of content . . . [which might] drasti-
cally change the strategy for the deployment of wi-fi hot-
spots across the city, for instance. And will influence
potentially even the pricing models. . . . So these concepts
. . . should influence the core strategy that the company de-
velops and deploys. (Bruce)
To summarize, Bruce and other R&D designers generate fu-
ture concepts with far-reaching strategic implications. The re-
sulting artifacts are prototypes, models, graphic boards, and
simulations. Board-level directors and top-level managers
use R&D designers’ artifacts to understand, gain consensus,
and make judgments around new technology applications
that may imply new business opportunities and directions.
3.1.3. Chris
Chris works in a small London-based product strategy con-
sultancy employing a dozen or so mostly designers but also
researchers. Chris trained and works as a designer, has been
in the firm for 5 years, has been a director for 2, and has about
6 years’ experience in the design industry.
The company advises client firms on diverse design-re-
lated issues, such as market positioning, portfolio planning,
and “product vision,” what they regard as the front end re-
search of the product design and development process.
Most of their clients are large multinational consumer goods
brands, each with its own in-house design and R&D team and
a network of external agencies such as market researchers.
These teams have their own specialisms, but clients come
to the consultancy for their particular approach to synthesis.
Chris believes their strength lies in three capabilities: integrat-
ing and mediating between professional domains (“speaking
the language and empathising” with, e.g., R&D, engineering,
and marketing); working at the micro- and macrolevel, from
global, long-term influences down to detailed design guide-
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lines; and capturing and conveying findings in rich, meaning-
ful, visually sophisticated communications.
We help develop processes, and frame problems to come
up with recommendations about what they should do
next, generally around their products. . . . A lot of our cli-
ents say we bring rigour to something inherently subjec-
tive. . . . We are not relying on one source of evidence,
such as the brand dimension . . . [but] trying to identify
the sweet spot between these different things, and being
able to communicate that as a rationale. . . . To make sense
of that complexity we have to be quite systematic and struc-
tured about breaking down those different areas and think-
ing about the dynamics within each of them. (Chris)
“Being able to communicate” here means both an explicit
rationale behind any recommendations, backed up with
hard data, and a visualization of complex or hard to articulate
findings.
What people value is our ability to analyse, structure, and
synthesise complex issues, then communicate them in a
really engaging way. So it’s a real use of design skills at
that end, creating an engaging artifact, whether that’s a
book, [a movie,] or a CD or report. (Chris)
Chris gives an example of such a symbolic representation, a
printed magazine mock-up, to help a client make sense of
market segmentation data. According to Chris, most consu-
mer needs segmentation data from marketing teams is dense,
quantitative, and hard to make sense of, especially by design-
ers. In this instance, his firm was engaged to translate this data
for the client’s own designers, who would then execute the
detailed design work:
We might do more qualitative research [into] attitudes and
behaviours to, say, social networks, their families, leisure,
their jobs. Then synthesise that to bring it to life. Our out-
put could be a physical printed book, it’s very editorial, as
if in the style of the magazines that those people would be
buying. Making it as visual and tangible as possible but
bringing in data where necessary. (Chris)
The format is carefully chosen and executed to frame and give
sense, to embody and convey complex meaning (not just in-
formation) with immediate impact “across silos . . . into the
hands of others in order to use it.” In other instances, such
output has a more senior audience and aids sensemaking at
the top tier:
We place a lot of emphasis on the media we produce, even
if it is about higher level strategic recommendations, it is
not in the form that people usually receive that sort of thing,
which seems to go down well. (Chris)
The firm also works around product portfolio strategy, plan-
ning, and rationalizing a client’s product ranges for the 5-
to 10-year future, creating tools and processes “to structure
and articulate the brand.” Designed outputs are produced to
symbolize a long-term possibility or objective, or “product
vision.”
We sometimes work with [other designers] to articulate
this end game, this Product Vision—it’s not really what
it will look like, but a manifestation of that strategy
we’ve plotted out. So, if we get all that in place, this is
where we could end up, what it might look like. It’s some-
thing to work towards, a sort of motivating tool for people
to use. It also gives people a sense that their work is part of
something bigger. . . . Or it can be internal tool for people
to say “look this is what our brand is all about, what we
should be fighting for.” (Chris)
Like a concept car, these artifacts are never intended to go into
production for the market. They are symbolic or emblematic
of a future identity of the firm, and give sense to the unknown
future, to the company vision, and to employee purpose and
belonging (hence company culture).
Most of these companies have corporate mission, vision,
departmental mission, vision, but they are still at a very ab-
stract level, they are just words. This makes it more touch-
able. . . . It could be a model, an experience prototype,
packaging, accessories, maybe screen mock-ups if there
is any interactivity. It is not meant to be a design as such,
more of away of articulating a strategy, you need to educate
people in how to read that as a concept, rather than some-
thing that will be seen in the market. People are not neces-
sarily used to dealing with physical artifacts in that way.
We sometimes use the idea of the concept car as a meta-
phor. (Chris)
Artifacts are also used for issue selling by the client (mid-
level) to demonstrate and promote their activities to senior
management:
[It is also] a way for senior management to validate that
they are on the right track, that they have confidence in a
set of initiatives, and it is leading somewhere it, it’s not
just aimless. (Chris)
In summary, Chris and his colleagues create artifacts (models,
films, books, magazine mock-ups, simulations, and dia-
grams) that visually articulate complex and uncertain con-
texts. Managers (their client) use the artifacts to embody
rich qualitative data and “bring it to life” for constituents in
other operations. Managers and directors use the artifacts as
symbols of a product strategy vision for other constituents
within and outside the (client) firm, for legitimating their ac-
tivities to seniors and directors.Collating all three cases, I pro-
pose an interpretation of the designers’ roles in relation to
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other strategy actors, in which sensemaking and sensegiving
activities may include the following:
1. Designers’ sensemaking and sensegiving activities in-
terpret, combine, and synthesize from diverse contexts,
generating artifacts that symbolize complex and uncer-
tain contexts, future concepts, or objectives.
2. Top-tier managers and executives use artifacts in sense-
making, building consensus, and aiding decision mak-
ing around new business opportunities and directions.
3. Managers use artifacts in sensegiving, to embody rich
qualitative data and “bring it to life,” aiding sensemak-
ing by constituents in other operations.
4. Managers and directors use the artifacts in sensegiving,
as symbols of a product strategy vision, for sensemak-
ing by other constituents in the rest of the organization
and outside it.
5. Managers use the artifacts in issue selling, for legitimat-
ing their activities to seniors and directors.
6. Top-tier and midlevel managers use designers’ artifacts
in sensegiving, to “build up passion” around a strategic
vision for other constituents.
4. DISCUSSION
In this review of literature from design research and micro-
strategy, I have set out my claim that designed artifacts may
be valuable symbolic resources in strategic sensemaking
and sensegiving. I have then used extracts from three inter-
views with designers as examples to illustrate this claim.
“Strategy practices are the social, symbolic, and material
tools through which strategy work is done” (Jarzabkowski &
Whittington, 2008, p. 282), and I have argued that microstrat-
egy should include in these practices designed artifacts used
for internal purposes. I also propose that, as strategy practices,
design and designed artifacts are types of “enactment”
(Weick, 1995, 2001), that is, they are “a means to gain
some sense of what one is up against, as when one asks ques-
tions, . . . builds a prototype to evoke reactions, makes a dec-
laration to see what response it pulls, or probes something to
see how it reacts” (Weick, 2001, p. 462).
The deliberate design of boundary objects, as described by
the designers in the interview extracts, seems to be a particular
type of design worth investigating further. Artifacts such as
Chris’s magazine, Bruce’s not too funky interactive proto-
type, or Andy’s 20 phone handsets are important not for their
manifest function (as a magazine, a navigation system, a
smart phone, or whatever) but for their symbolic function,
which may be regarded as a socially constructed “status func-
tion” (Searle, 1995; see also Crilly, 2010, for a synthesis of
theories of artifact functions). As Chris says, each prototype
is “not meant to be a design as such, more of a way of articu-
lating a strategy.” Here “a design” (the noun) means a repre-
sentation or blueprint for the real thing. However, these arti-
facts will never go into production; there will be no real thing.
Still, like a concept car, these artifacts must be designed as if
for an end user or customer in some believable ways for them
to perform their symbolic purpose. I stress the word believ-
able, because belief is precisely the objective. The concept
car may be nuclear powered or have no steering wheel, but
it must be recognizably a car to serve its symbolic purpose
(“See how bold/innovative/green/ethical we are!”). Like Ma-
gritte’s pipe, the phone is not a phone, although it needs to be
a convincing symbol of one. It must be designed as if for
users, as if it affords the making of phone calls and all the
other exciting functions promised. However, its users are
not really users at all but readers, collectively making sense,
finding shared meaning in what it symbolizes.3
4.1. Limitations and further work
The aim of this article is not to make generalizable claims
about these phenomena, nor are the interview extracts pre-
sented to prove the link between strategic sensemaking and
design. Both aims would need a more focused and rigorous
research approach, as is discussed shortly. By drawing atten-
tion to their occurrence in industry practice, I hope to provoke
interest in this possibility. Rouleau’s (2005) account is rare in
that it brings the role of designed artifacts into the microstrat-
egy/strategic cognition literature. When published, it was also
rare in its microstrategy approach, connecting “what goes on
deep inside organizations and broader phenomena outside”
(Whittington, 2006, p. 617). Perhaps now microstrategy is
an established research domain, there will be more empirical
work exploring design in this context.
I must be clear to acknowledge that the argument presented
from literature is not a deductive, clear-cut case for design in
strategic sensemaking but a proposition arrived at abduc-
tively; I argue that the conceptual overlap of strategy, sense-
making, and design warrants deeper investigation. Although
designed artifacts can be powerful symbols, embodying and
conveying meaning, there are many other factors that will
likely play a part in managers’ and executives’ sensemaking.
I do not wish to overstate the proportional impact of these ar-
tifacts. Further work might seek to answer in what kinds of
situations or organizations is the impact higher? Are there cer-
tain types of organizations that are more open to using design
in this way? Is design an overlooked resource in the strategy
context? Is the role equally valid in organizations not in-
volved in product development (such as services or nonprof-
its)?
3 Interviews in 17 UK firms were carried out over 3 years (2007–2010),
and deep case studies were made of 2 of these firms. Firms were judged
suitable based on being accessible and willing participants and having
some visible design activity. Semistructured interviews were conducted
with designers, product managers, and others in senior design related roles.
Interview recordings were transcribed verbatim. Discussions were loosely
structured around four key concepts relating to the use of design throughout
the organization. The concepts were deliberately broad to avoid biasing the
responses with leading questions. They were stakeholder involvement in de-
sign activities, design support of the firm’s operations, roles of design from
strategy to market, and evolving contributions of design over time.
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The interview cases here do not carry much weight alone,
limited as they are by the small sample size, cherry-picked to
illustrate the point beingmade. The respondents quoted are all
designers who, knowingly or otherwise, may have a tendency
to overstate their role. We are missing an important voice: that
of the senior strategy makers themselves who could corrobo-
rate the claims made by the designers.
4.2. Implications for design communication practice
The mediating role of artifacts in microstrategy is relevant to
readers who are active in design, strategy, or research. As it
stands, the claim made here may provoke reflection among
practitioners as to whether they are already involved in such
a role. If it is corroborated in further research, then designers
like those quoted, who already engage in such activities, may
understand and find recognition for the usefulness of their
work and be better able to articulate its value. Other design-
ers, whether in-house or agency, will be able to make a better
case for a communication role at the strategic level and con-
sider expanding their activities to explicitly engage in sym-
bolic sensemaking and sensegiving activities. Managers
and strategy makers may be curious to include designers to
aid communication through sensemaking and sensegiving
in strategic activities they would never thought relevant to
design.
4.3. Implications for research
This article deals with the conceptual overlap of (at least) two
disciplines. By making this claim, I aim to draw the attention
of researchers in the microstrategy and strategic management
fields, to increase awareness, interest, and research into the
role of design in sensemaking and sensegiving.
Current views of the roles of artifacts (Eckert & Boujut,
2003; Crilly et al., 2008) neglect the internal strategic use
of artifacts expressly designed for their symbolic rather than
their manifest function. There are echoes here of critical de-
sign (Dunne, 1999; Dunne & Raby, 2001) and of proposi-
tional design (e.g., Walker, 2006), activities that both aim
to provoke debate through the design of artifacts; however,
I suggest these concepts are currently more the preserve of
academia or the art world than of industry. Further efforts
to characterize the practice and artifacts involved could bring
clarity to their propositional role in communication. In strat-
egy research, Powell et al. (2011, p. 1377) call for efforts to
understand “executive judgment in the actual conditions of
high-stakes, complex problem solving in organizations . . .
[and for] improving the psychological architecture of the
firm.” Further investigations of the claim of this article would
lead toward these aims.
Follow-up studies will need to consider the interpretive na-
ture of the phenomenon: to capture the meanings ascribed to
the artifacts by the members of the organization (not only by
the researchers), to be grounded in the organization culture,
and to deeply involve “informants who are experiencing the
strategic change effort” themselves (Gioia & Chittipeddi,
1991, p. 435). A case study approach should take these into
account, not relying on interview data alone but including
ethnographic data and observations (Jarzabkowski, 2003).
Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991) provide an exemplary dual-
researcher methodology for such an enquiry, in which they
use an “insider” researcher who is a participant in the strategic
change process to gather ethnographic data. This is then ana-
lyzed more objectively by an “outsider” researcher.
5. CONCLUSION
Based on empirical research literature, illustrated with ex-
tracts from three interviews with designers, I have built my
claims that: sensemaking is an important concept in design
and in strategy; design methods and tools are valuable in strat-
egy for exploring possibilities and building meaning; bound-
ary objects are important in microstrategy and in designing;
designed artifacts may be meaningful boundary objects;
and designed artifacts may be symbolic resources, valuable
in sensemaking and sensegiving.
The typical design process in which designers (individuals,
a team, and/or their managers) respond to a brief applies when
the purpose of the resulting artifacts is to go into production
and then to market. However, in recognizing the less typical,
underexamined design activities that may not lead directly to
a marketed product, I have proposed a hitherto unrecognized
role of designed artifacts in sensemaking and sensegiving as
part of microstrategy.
Because of the breadth of the topic, this article must be
considered a work in progress, a call for further empirical ex-
ploration of such a complex subject. Design in such a role
should be examined further, to better characterize the way it
is done, its recognition among practitioners, and its value, im-
pact, and influence.
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